We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.
I. Introduction
There is a large body of literature showing that social networks are a frequently used job search method (Granovetter, 1995; Bayer et al., 2008; Bentolila et al., 2010; Glitz, 2017) , and it is believed that employed social contacts are more useful for obtaining a job than unemployed social contacts. If workers with high unemployment probability, such as ethnic minorities and low-skilled immigrants, are isolated in the social network from others with better labor market outcomes, their disadvantages are exacerbated by the lack of social capital Jackson, 2004, 2007) . The social integration of these worker groups is believed to decrease their unemployment rates and increase their earnings.
In this paper, we revisit these ideas and show that changing the social network position of disadvantaged workers might not be sufficient to improve their labor market outcomes, as social integration must be accompanied by spillover effects that increase the productivity of workers. We build a search-and-matching model with two worker types: low-skilled workers with a low productivity level and job opportunities only in the low-skill sector of the economy, and high-skilled workers with a high productivity level and job opportunities in both the high-and low-skill sector of the economy. Workers can find a job either in the formal market or through their social contacts where it is assumed that only employed contacts are useful for job searching. The two worker groups differ in the characteristics of their social networks, more specifically, in the number and types of neighbors. We parametrize the degree of interconnectedness between the two groups, which represents the degree of social segregation/integration or the network homophily level. When the homophily level is high, low-skilled workers are mostly connected to other low-skilled workers. When the homophily level is low, the two groups mix with each other.
First, we study the impact of the homophily level on the labor market outcomes when segregation affects only the type of social contacts that workers have and use for job search. We find that the relationship between the homophily level and the job-finding rate of low-skilled workers is nonmonotonic. There exists an intermediate homophily level that maximizes the job-finding rate of low-skilled workers. The intuition for this result is as follows. When the homophily level is small, low-skilled workers will mostly be connected to high-skilled workers, while high-skilled workers will be connected to a pool of low-and high-skilled workers. This implies that the unemployment rate among the neighbors of high-skilled workers will be larger than the unemployment rate among the neighbors of lowskilled workers. Consequently, there will be more competition among the neighbors of high-skilled workers for the job information they possess. We show that, for this reason, a high-skilled worker is less likely to transmit job information to a given social contact of theirs than a low-skilled worker, despite the fact that a high-skilled worker is more likely to be employed. Low-skilled workers can thus improve their chances of finding a job by severing links to high-skilled workers and establishing links to other lowskilled workers. In contrast, when the homophily level is high, low-skilled workers are mostly connected to each other, so they are less likely to be employed and to possess job information. Low-skilled workers can improve their job-finding chances through social integration. There exists an intermediate homophily level that maximizes the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers.
We solve the model for plausible parameter values and we show that the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers follows a U-shaped pattern in the homophily level and that it is minimal for an intermediate homophily level. The unemployment rate of low-skilled workers can be the same in a highly segregated society and in an integrated society. Moreover, wages earned by low-skilled workers follow an inverse U-shaped pattern in the homophily level, and they are maximized by an intermediate level of network homophily. This is because wages are determined by Nash bargaining; they are influenced by the outside options of workers, which are best when job-finding chances are highest. In addition, we find that high-skilled workers prefer a highly segregated society where their unemployment rate is low and wages are high. Desegregation does not make either of the two groups better off.
Our findings substantially change when we assume that integration not only affects the job-finding opportunities through social contacts but also increases the productivity of low-skilled workers. In this case, the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers decreases with integration and their wages monotonically increase. We also find that high-skilled workers do not benefit from integration in this case, either. As the productivity level of low-skilled workers increases, firms post more vacancies in the low-skilled sector of the economy, which increases the mismatch rate of employed high-skilled workers. This negatively affects their welfare, despite decreasing their unemployment rate.
We argue that the model explains various findings in the empirical literature about the labor market effects of social integration. The first application of the model concerns the Moving-to-Opportunity (MTO) experiment. Between 1994 and 1997, in five US cities, the MTO experiment gave residents of high-poverty neighborhoods the opportunity to relocate to low-poverty neighborhoods. Households eligible for public housing were randomly assigned to one of three groups: the first group received housing vouchers that could be used in census tracts with a less than 10 percent poverty rate; the second group received housing vouchers that could be used without restrictions; and a control group received no assistance. The neighborhood-effects literature (see Topa, 2001; Bayer et al., 2008) shows that individuals living in the same neighborhood have correlated labor market outcomes due to the social network effects of finding a job. This would imply that MTO participants should be able to improve their labor market outcomes by building connections to residents of low-poverty neighborhoods. Kling et al. (2007) , Ludwig et al. (2012) , and Chetty et al. (2016) evaluate the experiment's impact on labor market outcomes and find no significant improvement in the wages of those who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods as adults. 1 In contrast, Chetty et al. (2016) find substantial improvements in the earnings of those individuals who were under 13 at the time of relocation. Chetty et al. (2016) argue that relocation and exposure to better neighborhoods where poverty rates were low contributed to the development of the cognitive skills of young children. Their argument is based on the results of Heckman (2006) who shows that important cognitive skills develop in early childhood and that these determine both the ability to learn in later ages and productivity as an adult. Moving to a better neighborhood thus improved the productivity of those individuals who were very young at the time of relocation. The model's predictions can explain these findings: the labor market outcomes of low-skilled workers cannot be improved by desegregation when it affects the structure of job referral networks only. When it also has a positive impact on the productivity level of low-skilled workers, it improves the labor market outcomes.
The second application of the model concerns the social integration of immigrant workers. A larger part of the literature shows that co-ethnic networks facilitate the job search of immigrants and help them to access better paying jobs (Munshi, 2003; Beaman, 2011; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012) . It is believed that the social integration of immigrant workers with natives should also have a positive impact on the immigrants' labor market outcomes, as natives are more likely to be employed and to possess valuable job information. Empirical papers find a positive correlation between socializing with native workers and the employment probability and wages of immigrants (Kazemipur, 2006; Kahanec and Mendola, 2009; Lancee, 2010) . However, most of these papers do not take into account the endogeneity of network formation with natives: there might be unobserved worker characteristics that explain both social integration and favorable labor market outcomes. When this endogeneity is properly addressed, the impact of social integration becomes less clear: Chiswick and Wang (2016) and Li (2017) find no significant impact of being connected to natives on the labor market outcomes of immigrants, while Kanas et al. (2011) find a significant positive impact. Our model shows that the integration of immigrants among natives can create competition among immigrant workers for the job information possessed by native workers, in which case social integration has no positive impact on the labor market outcomes of immigrants. Social integration has a positive impact only if it also creates productivity spillovers.
The results of the previous empirical and theoretical literature imply that social desegregation would always be beneficial for low-skilled workers. The empirical literature on neighborhood effects shows that individuals living in the same neighborhood have correlated labor market outcomes, and are likely to work in the same workplace (O'Regan and Quigley, 1998; Topa, 2001; Bayer et al., 2008) . This literature suggests that if low-skilled workers move to low-poverty neighborhoods, they can improve their labor market outcomes by connecting to individuals who have higher education. Our contribution shows that desegregation is beneficial only up to a point and that there exists a homophily level minimizing the unemployment rate and maximizing wages earned by low-skilled workers.
In the game-theoretic literature, Martí and Zenou (2017) study network formation and segregation between communities, assuming that the link formation cost within communities is different from the link formation cost across communities. Their results suggest that an integrated society might not provide a larger welfare than a segregated society when policies aiming to reduce inter-community socialization costs are introduced. We obtain similar results here, focusing on a labor market context and a searchand-matching model with job contact networks.
Finally, the model presented here largely builds on previous search-andmatching models with social networks (see Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Cahuc and Fontaine, 2009; Stupnytska and Zaharieva, 2015) . In particular, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005) show that the competition for job information among indirect neighbors gives rise to a non-monotonic relationship between network connectivity and the job-finding rate. Our result on the impact of social segregation is similar as we also find a nonmonotonic relationship that is based on the competition for job information. However, our model introduces different types of workers and considers the degree of interconnectedness between groups. In addition, we show that these effects can be relevant for the explanation of the labor market effects of the MTO experiment and the integration of immigrant workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the details of the model. In Section III, we show that there exists a homophily level that maximizes the job-finding rate via social contacts for low-skilled workers. We show the results of some comparative statics of this homophily level. We then solve the model numerically for two different cases, when segregation affects the network structure only and also when it affects the productivity level of low-skilled workers. In Section IV, we discuss the applications of the model. We conclude in Section V and we discuss some of the critical assumptions of the model. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
II. The Model
In this section, the general modeling framework is introduced. The model is written in continuous time, and workers live forever and are risk-neutral. The measure of workers is normalized to one. There are two groups of workers in the economy: low-skilled and high-skilled. The share of lowskilled workers is π L , and the share of high-skilled workers is π H = 1 − π L . The two groups differ in their productivity levels and the characteristics of their social networks (i.e., the number and type of their social contacts). There are two types of jobs in the economy. In one sector, the skill requirement is high and only high-skilled workers can be employed. In another sector, the skill requirement is low and workers from both groups can be employed. High-skilled workers are mismatched in this sector and earn lower wages than in the first sector. They search on the job to find a position in the high-skilled sector. Workers can find a job through their social contacts or via the formal labor market. We describe these search channels in the next section.
Matching Function
Unemployed workers have two different ways to access job information: the formal market and their social contacts. Consider the formal market first. We assume that there are two types of vacancies: the vacancy rates in the high-skill and low-skill sectors are denoted by v H and v L , respectively. Considering the formal market, the arrival rate of a job offer from sector j ∈ {L(ow − skilled), H(igh − skilled)} to any given worker is given by
where A j is a sector-specific scaling parameter and η is the elasticity of the arrival rate with respect to the vacancy rate. 2 The second search channel is the social network. The network structure is given by four parameters: k H , k L , γ H , and γ L . Workers of a given group i ∈ {L, H} are identical in terms of network position and have k i social contacts. Social segregation is represented by the type of links a worker has: γ i k i links connect a worker of group i to contacts in the same group, while (1 − γ i )k i links connect a worker to workers in the other group −i. When γ H = 1 and γ L = 1, the network is completely segregated (i.e., it consists of two groups that are not connected to each other). If γ i > π i , there is a preference for connecting to a member of one's own group (homophily) in the network. When γ i = π i , the two groups completely mix, while if γ i < π i , workers tend to be connected to members of the other group (heterophily). 3 Given these parameters, network links are randomly drawn between workers.
2 Note that the matching function takes a reduced form: it does not depend on the unemployment rate because employed workers pass on, to their social contacts, job offers that they hear about. 3 Note that, in some studies, homophily is defined as having the majority of social contacts from one's own group, without any reference to the population share of the group. The definition we use here is normally referred to in the literature as inbreeding homophily. Inbreeding homophily takes into account the fact that members of a larger group have a higher tendency to meet each other just by chance. See McPherson et al. (2001) and Currarini et al. (2009) for details on the different definitions of homophily.
To ensure that the social network is consistently defined, we need to restrict the values of the four network parameters. Because network links between individuals are mutual (undirected), the total number of links connecting low-skilled to high-skilled workers has to be equal to the total number of links going from high-skilled to low-skilled workers. This condition can be written as
where the left-hand side is the number of links going from low-skilled to high-skilled workers. In the subsequent analysis, we change the values of the parameters γ L , k L , and k H , and compute the value of γ H using this equation. Note that when the segregation level of low-skilled workers (γ L ) rises, the share of intragroup links (γ H ) also increases for high-skilled workers. This is clear from equation (2), which implies that the derivative of γ H with respect to γ L is positive, that is,
It is further assumed that only employed social contacts transmit job information to their peers as unemployed contacts would prefer to use the job information for themselves. High-skilled jobs can only be accessed through high-skilled workers employed in the high-skill sector. This is consistent with the assumption of on-the-job search because mismatched high-skilled workers have no incentives to forward job offers from the high-skill sector. We also assume that low-skilled jobs can be obtained through any employed low-or high-skilled worker. In particular, highskilled workers employed in the high-skilled sector can also be sources of low-skilled job offers as, in reality, firms employ workers with different educational backgrounds and it could easily be the case that someone in a higher position is aware of the firm's openings in lower positions. For example, a university professor might know that their department is looking for a secretary.
We suppose that employed workers, who possess job information, share the information with one randomly chosen neighbor of theirs who is looking for a job and can work in the sector of the job offer. In particular, low-skilled jobs are transmitted to a randomly chosen high-or low-skilled unemployed social contact. High-skilled job offers are shared with a randomly chosen unemployed or mismatched high-skilled worker.
Based on these assumptions, we derive the job-finding rate through the network channel. Workers from group i can obtain job information in the low-skill sector through their contacts at the following rate,
where u i denotes the unemployment rate among workers of group i. The intuition behind this expression is as follows. Workers from group i have k i γ i social contacts from their own group, and each contact is assumed to possess low-skilled job information with probability q M L (v L ) (the market job arrival rate) and to be employed with probability (1 − u i ). Employed contacts, who have information about a vacancy, choose a random unemployed neighbor of their and pass the information on to this neighbor. Therefore, the probability that a type i employed social contact will give an unemployed neighbor the job information can be expressed as
is the average probability that a neighbor of a type i worker is unemployed. Here, 1 − (1 −ū i ) k i is the probability that the employed neighbors will have at least one unemployed contact out of their k i contacts. In this case, the expected number of unemployed neighbors is kū i , and each of them has 1/(kū i ) probability of receiving the job information.
As for the second term, workers of group i have k i (1 − γ i ) social contacts in the other group −i. Each of these contacts is informed about a vacancy with probability q M L (v L ) and is employed with probability (1 − u −i ). An employed contact transmits the job information to a random unemployed neighbor, and each of them receives the information with probability P −i , where the expression for P −i is analogous to P i .
In a similar way, we derive the job-finding rate of high-skilled jobs for high-skilled workers. This differs from the previous formula in that only high-skilled workers employed in the high-skilled sector can share job information and they only forward this information to high-skilled workers:
Here, e H H is the fraction of high-skilled workers employed in highskill sector. A high-skilled worker has k H γ H e H H high-skilled neighbors employed in the high-skilled sector, and each of them has q M H (v H ) probability of hearing about a job offer in the high-skill sector. The job information is forwarded to a randomly chosen high-skilled neighbor who is either unemployed or employed in the low-skill sector. The probability that a neighbor will compete for this job information is u H + e H L = 1 − e H H , and 1 − e
is the probability that the high-skilled worker who possesses the job information has at least one such neighbor. In this case, the expected number of competitors is (1 − e H H )k H γ H , and each of them has 1/[(1 − e H H )k H γ H ] probability of receiving the job information.
Assuming continuous time, the aggregate job-finding rate is the sum of the job-finding rates through the two job search channels: q ij = q M j + q N ij . The unemployment rates are determined by the worker flows between the states of unemployment and employment. In equilibrium, the labor market is in such a steady state that the outflow from unemployment is equal to the inflow, and this holds for both worker groups and both sectors. Workers find employment with the rate q ij as defined above. Job separations occur according to a Poisson process with parameter λ: match productivity drops to zero when a shock hits the firm and workers lose their jobs. In addition, mismatched high-skilled workers quit their jobs when they find a position in the high-skill sector. The steady-state conditions are given by the following three equations:
Worker Value Functions
The instantaneous utility obtained by an unemployed worker is denoted by b, which represents the unemployment benefits received and the value of leisure time. We assume that this is common between the two worker types. The discounted expected value of being unemployed for a low-skilled worker is given by
where r denotes the discount rate that is assumed to be common between workers and firms, and
is the transition rate from unemployment to employment. This transition increases a worker's utility by W LL − U L , where W LL is the utility received when employed in the low-skill sector.
The discounted expected utility of unemployment for a high-skilled worker is analogous to the previous expression, with the only difference being that high-skilled workers can work in both sectors of the economy:
We define the low-skilled worker's discounted utility in employment as
where w LL is the wage paid to low-skilled workers. At the rate λ, job separation occurs, workers move to unemployment, and their utility changes accordingly. High-skilled workers either work mismatched in the low-skill sector or work in the high-skill sector. Their wages differ between the two sectors. Mismatched workers can search on the job and switch to a high-skilled job at the rate q H H (e H H , v H ). The discounted expected utility of employed high-skilled workers is given, for low-and high-skilled jobs, respectively, by
and
Job Creation
In each sector, firms post vacancies and pay costs until the vacancy is filled. The vacancy posting cost is denoted by c. A low-skilled vacancy can be filled by either a low-skilled worker or a high-skilled worker, but a highskilled vacancy can only be filled by a high-skilled worker. We assume that low-skilled workers are less productive. High-skilled workers are more productive in the high-skilled sector than in the low-skilled sector. However, in the low-skilled sector they are more productive than the low-skilled workers. This latter assumption is based on the results of the literature on overeducation and mismatch, where it is found that overeducated workers earn higher wages than employees with a lower education level (see Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011 , for a literature review). The productivity levels can thus be ranked as p LL < p H L < p H H . This implies that the wages are ranked as w LL < w H L < w H H . Given these assumptions, we characterize the equation that determines the number of vacancies posted. The discounted expected profit of a firm from posting a vacancy in the low-skilled sector is given by
The firm pays c until the vacancy is filled either by a high-skilled worker at a rate
Note that J ij denotes the value of a filled vacancy, which depends on the employee's type and is defined by the following equations:
In the high-skill sector, a vacancy can only be filled by a high-skilled worker, which occurs at a rate
The value of a vacancy and a filled job is given, respectively, by
Free entry of firms guarantees that the value of vacancy posting decreases to zero in both sectors: V L = V H = 0. Substituting this equation into the value functions of the firms and solving the resulting system gives the condition for vacancy posting for low-and high-skill sectors respectively:
These conditions state that the cost of vacancy posting has to be equal to its expected benefit, which results from the hiring of a worker.
Wage Determination
Wages are determined by generalized Nash bargaining between the worker and the firm:
Here, i is the worker type, j is the job type, and β denotes the bargaining power of the worker. 4 The maximization problem yields the following wage equations: 5
4 For simplicity, we assume that when mismatched high-skilled workers find a job in the high-skill sector and bargain for the wage, their outside option is unemployment, not being employed in the low-skill sector. A similar assumption was made in Gautier (2002) and Chapter 4 of Pissarides (2000) . 5 See the final subsection of the Online Appendix for the calculation details.
Wages are increasing with the job-finding rates q ij (·) because workers have better outside options when their job-finding rate is higher. Wages also increase with the productivity of the worker. It is easy to show that wages can be ranked as w LL < w H L < w H H .
Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is given by the eight-tuple
satisfies the three wage equations (22), (23), and (24), the vacancy posting conditions (19) and (20), and the three steady-state conditions of labor market turnover (equations (6), (7), and (8)).
III. Partial Equilibrium Results: Impact of the Homophily Level on the Job Finding Rate
Our primary interest concerns the relationship between the homophily level of low-skilled workers γ L and their labor market outcomes. In this section, we focus on the low-skill sector as this is the sector that employs low-skilled workers. We derive analytical results for the partial equilibrium case, that is, for fixed values of the endogenous variables
In the next section, we confirm that these results hold in the general case, when all these variables are endogenously determined in equilibrium. The impact of the homophily level on the job-finding rate is summarized in the following two lemmas.
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The skill-type of social contacts influences the job-finding rate through social networks in two different ways. First, low-skilled and high-skilled workers have different employment rates, and social contacts from the group with the higher employment rate are more likely to pass on job offers. Second, employed low-skilled and high-skilled workers might differ in the probability of transmitting a job offer due to the number of unemployed contacts they have. The more unemployed neighbors a social contact has, the lower probability each of them has of receiving job information. The number of unemployed contacts depends both on the number of contacts k i and the probability that each contact is unemployedū i . If the condition in Lemma 1 (Lemma 2) holds, low-skilled (high-skilled) workers become less (more) likely to receive job information when the homophily level rises. 6 In the contrary case, low-skilled workers can increase their job-finding rates by redistributing links from high-skilled to low-skilled workers.
In the remaining part of this section, we focus on the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers, and we study the parameter values for which the condition in Lemma 1 holds. We show that when the homophily level is low, the condition does not hold: increasing the homophily level improves the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers. In contrast, for a high homophily level, the condition holds: low-skilled workers would benefit from connecting to high-skilled workers. In other words, there exists an intermediate homophily level that maximizes the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers.
There exists a homophily level 0 < γ * L < 1 that maximizes the job-finding rate through social contacts for low-skilled workers.
Changing the homophily level alters the neighborhood composition of low-skilled and high-skilled workers. In the one extreme case, when the homophily level of low-skilled workers is low, most of the social contacts of low-skilled workers are high-skilled. In contrast, high-skilled workers are linked to a mix of low-skilled and high-skilled contacts. Given this, because low-skilled workers are more likely to be unemployed, a highskilled worker will have more unemployed social contacts than a lowskilled worker. Therefore, there is more competition for the job information possessed by an employed high-skilled contact than an employed low-skilled social contact. This implies that low-skilled workers can increase their jobfinding rate by increasing the number of links connecting them to fellow low-skilled workers and severing links to high-skilled workers. This holds despite the fact that a low-skilled social tie is less likely to be employed and have an unneeded job offer than a high-skilled social contact.
The competition effect dominates only if workers have sufficiently many social contacts and the unemployment rate is not too large. The competition effect naturally depends on the number of neighbors who compete for the same job. However, if the unemployment rate is high, the employment rate of network neighbors determines whether they are able to forward job information. Nevertheless, conditions specified in Proposition 1 hold for the empirically relevant values of the variables. To further highlight the intuitions, we discuss two numerical examples. Example 1. Suppose that the share of low-skilled workers is 20 percent (π L = 0.2), their unemployment rate is 15 percent (u L = 0.15). The unemployment rate of high-skilled workers is 5 percent (u H = 0.05) and all workers have 40 social contacts (k L = k H = 40). Further suppose that only 5 percent of the contacts of low-skilled workers are from the lowskilled group (γ L = 0.05). Then, equation (1) implies that γ H = 0.76 and 1 − γ H = 0.24. This means that among the social contacts of highskilled workers the share of low-skilled workers is 24 percent, larger than their share among the social ties of low-skilled workers. γ H is larger than γ L because high-skilled workers are the larger group in the society, connecting to a few low-skilled workers does not change their social network significantly. The probability that an unemployed worker can obtain job information from a given employed low-skilled contact is P L = 0.4, the same number for high-skilled contacts is P H = 0.32. Combining this with the probability that a given contact is employed, we obtain that a given lowskilled contact passes job information with probability (1 − u L )P L = 0.35 which is larger than the probability of a high-skilled contact helping to find a job (1 − u H )P H = 0.31. Low-skilled contacts are therefore more useful for job searching than high-skilled social ties.
Example 2. Note that it is not essential to assume that the low-skilled worker group is the larger group in society. Suppose again that u L = 0.15, u H = 0.05, k L = k H = 40, and γ L = 0.05. Assume now that π L = π H = 0.5. Then, equation (1) gives γ H = 0.05. A low-skilled contact is again more likely to provide job information
163. This effect is generated by the large number of low-skilled neighbors of high-skilled social contacts who compete for the same job information.
In contrast, when the network of low-skilled workers is highly segregated, most of their neighbors are also low-skilled workers who are more likely to be unemployed. Connecting to low-skilled workers is not beneficial for finding a job both because they themselves are less likely to be employed and also because there is more competition for the job information possessed by employed low-skilled social contacts. The jobfinding rate of low-skilled workers increases with the homophily level when the network is very integrated, and it decreases when the network is very segregated. This shows that there is an intermediate homophily level where the job-finding rate is maximal.
Furthermore, we can show that if low-and high-skilled workers have the same number of contacts, a purely random allocation of links between lowskilled and high-skilled workers would not maximize the job-finding rate of low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers have to be over-represented among the contacts of low-skilled workers (γ L < π L ) because, as a result of their lower unemployment rate, they are more valuable than low-skilled social contacts. 
However, when the number of neighbors of high-skilled workers increases, the unemployment-minimizing homophily level rises. This is because there will be more competition for the job information possessed by high-skilled workers, which decreases the expected benefits from connecting to them. If high-skilled workers have sufficiently many social contacts, then low-skilled workers might prefer to completely segregate from high-skilled workers. It is plausible to expect high-skilled workers to possess more social contacts than low-skilled workers because they spend more time in employment, which increases their chances of connecting to co-workers. This is especially the case if the social contacts met in employment are more useful for job searching than the social contacts workers meet in unemployment (who might have a higher likelihood of being unemployed themselves).
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold value
In the following section, we study these effects for the general equilibrium case, when all endogenous variables are determined in equilibrium. We set realistic parameter values by using calibration methods.
IV. General Equilibrium Results: Numerical Analysis

Parameter Values
The parameter values are set to match some statistics of the US economy at monthly frequencies. The monthly separation rate is 0.036 following the estimates of Shimer (2005) , and this value was also used in Pissarides (2009) . The discount rate r is set equal to 0.004, corresponding to an annual interest rate of 2 percent. The worker's bargaining power is 0.5, which is a standard value in the literature (Pissarides, 2009 ). The firms' vacancy posting costs are set to c = 0.58 following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) . They calculate this value based on the labor costs of hiring and also by taking into account the fact that capital is idle during the hiring process, which is costly for the firm. 7 Regarding the value of non-market activity b, we set this to 0.71, based on Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Pissarides (2009) . Hall and Milgrom (2008) consider a standard model of labor supply and show that this value is consistent with the empirical evidence on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
We associate the low-skilled workers group with workers who have a high-school education, and the high-skilled group with workers who have at least a college degree. Given this, we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 dataset to set the share of low-skilled workers and the productivity differences between the two groups. We consider the years between 1994 and 2000 for which most individuals have already completed formal education. The dataset contains 12,686 individuals, out of which 5,809 have a high-school education and 5,759 individuals obtained at least a college degree. As we consider only two groups in the model, we calculate the relative share of low-skilled workers as π S = 5809/(5809 + 5759) = 0.502. We set the productivity differences between the two groups by the differences in the average hourly wages earned by the mentioned educational groups. We normalize the productivity level of the low-skilled worker group to p L = 1. We convert the wages to US dollars (USD) in 2000 using the consumer price index, and we pool the data among all jobs observed between 1994 and 2000. Given this, the average hourly wages earned by workers who completed high school is 10.47 USD, while the average hourly wages earned by college graduates is 16.1 USD. This means that the wage ratio between the two groups is 1.53. We target this wage 7 Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Pissarides (2009) choose lower values. Hall and Milgrom (2008) choose c = 0.433, but they take into account only the explicit hiring costs and they disregard the costs of idle capital. Pissarides (2009) sets the vacancy posting costs to 0.356, to equalize market tightness with 1. While our parameter choice is slightly larger than the values applied in these papers, our main conclusions do not depend on the choice of vacancy posting costs. ratio by setting
which gives one restriction on the productivity level of high-skilled workers.
In addition, we restrict the wage premium of a high-skilled worker employed in a mismatched job relative to low-skilled workers. Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) survey the literature on overeducation and find that in the United States the return to an additional year of education on top of the required education level is 4.6 percent, on average. This means that if college graduates have four years more education than what is required for lowskilled jobs, they earn 4 × 4.6 = 18.4 percent more than other workers who have the required level of education (i.e., who are low-skilled). In our model, this means that w H L /w LL = 1.184. These two restrictions lead to p H H = 1.831 and p H L = 1.196. We fix the unemployment rate of these two educational groups based on data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), downloaded from the website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States. Between 1994 and 2000, the unemployment rate among workers with at least a college degree was at 2.1 percent, while the unemployment rate among workers with a high-school education was at 5.4 percent. The model matches these outcomes when the efficiency parameter of the matching function A L is set to 0.431 and A H to 0.08.
As for the parameters of the network structure, we set the homophily level to γ L = γ H = 1, which means we assume that the two groups are completely segregated when setting the parameters. In the subsequent analysis, we study the comparative statics of the model regarding the homophily level γ L and we change this parameter between 0 and 1. For the high-skilled worker group, we set the number of neighbors to k H = 40. The available empirical evidence largely supports this parameter choice. For example, Cingano and Rosolia (2012) find that the median number of coworkers for an unemployed individual is 32, whereas in Glitz (2017) the same statistic is 43. Studies of online social interactions show that while individuals have many online "friendships", they effectively interact with fewer than 40 people (see Marlow et al., 2009) . As for the low-skilled worker group, it is plausible to think that they will have fewer contacts as their unemployment rate is higher and they spend less time being employed, which is when they can build up a co-worker network. We suppose that their number of neighbors is lower by a factor that is equal to the ratio of unemployment rates: u L /u H = 2.57. The number of connections for lowskilled workers is then set to k L = k H /2.57 ≈ 15. Our robustness checks show that the results are robust to the choice of parameter k L (see below). 
Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market: When It Affects the Network Structure Only
Using the parameter values outlined in the previous section, we numerically solve the model and analyze the impact of the homophily level on the labor market outcomes of the two groups. We change the homophily parameter of low-skilled workers (γ L ) between 0 and 1, and we use equation (2) to solve for the homophily level of high-skilled workers (γ H ). Results are shown in Figures 1-3 . For low-skilled workers, the job-finding rate is a non-monotonic function of the homophily level (see the upper-left panel of Figure 1) . As the homophily level rises, the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers first increase, then decrease. There exists a homophily level that maximizes the job-finding rate of low-skilled workers. These findings confirm the results of Proposition 1. For the calibrated parameter values, the job-finding rate maximizing homophily level is γ * = 0.75. This value is well above γ L = π L = 0.502, the value for which the two groups are perfectly mixed and the network is random. The job-finding chances can be the same in a highly segregated and a random network, because of the non-monotonic relationship between the homophily level and the job-finding rate via social contacts. The job-finding rate takes the same value when γ L = 0.502 and γ L = 0.98. We also find that the job-finding rate is the lowest in a highly heterophilous society (for low γ L ).
The upper-right panel of Figure 1 shows that the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers also follows a non-monotonic pattern in the homophily level. Wages are affected by the workers' outside options and job-finding possibilities. Through this channel, the homophily level affects the wages of low-skilled workers, which follow an inverse U-shaped pattern in the homophily level (see the bottom-left panel of Figure 1 ). Wages of low-skilled workers are highest when the homophily level takes the unemployment-minimizing value. This ensures that low-skilled workers have the highest utility at this homophily level both in employment and in unemployment.
Considering the total welfare of the low-skilled worker group, we suppose that all firms are owned by entrepreneurs who are not active on the supply side of the labor market. Therefore, low-skilled workers do not earn profits or pay vacancy posting costs. Given this assumption, we can measure the total welfare of the low-skilled worker group as
where welfare is equal to the sum of utility earned in unemployment and in employment. The bottom-right panel of Figure 1 shows that the total welfare of the low-skilled worker group is also a non-monotonic function of the homophily level.
We summarize the most important findings as follows. Turning to the impact of homophily on the high-skilled worker group (see Figure 2) , we find that high-skilled workers do not prefer a random social network either: their labor market outcomes are at their best when γ L is either low or high. When the homophily level is high, most social contacts of high-skilled workers are themselves high-skilled, and very likely to be employed and able to provide job information. These social contacts, however, are more likely to provide job information in the low-skilled sector because low-skilled offers are forwarded by any employed contact while high-skilled offers are only forwarded by those employed in the highskilled sector. This is consistent with the results of Bentolila et al. (2010) and Horvath (2014) , who show that social networks can create mismatch, especially when on-the-job search is allowed. Given this, the high-skilled unemployment rate is low when the homophily level is high; however, the employment rate in the high-skill sector e H H is somewhat low. There is also a second reason for the decrease of e H H : the relatively low unemployment rate increases the bargaining power of high-skilled workers, which raises their wages. This lowers the incentives for vacancy posting in the high-skill sector (see the upper-right panel of Figure 3) . Decreasing the homophily level has a non-monotonic impact on the outcomes of high-skilled workers as well. Their job-finding chances in the low-skilled sector first decrease, then increase (see Figure 2) . The initial decrease occurs because more of their contacts are from the low-skilled worker group and are more likely to be unemployed. When the homophily level is very low, however, the above-mentioned competition effect starts to dominate: low-skilled contacts are more valuable information sources of low-skilled jobs than high-skilled contacts are, and the job-finding rate for low-skilled jobs increases. These effects lead to the non-monotonic impact of the homophily level on the unemployment rate and wages. Wages are highest for an intermediate level of homophily, which decreases the incentives for vacancy posting in the high-skill sector (see the upper-right panel of Figure 3 ), reducing the employment rate there.
We assess the welfare of high-skilled workers, which can be expressed as
The lower-right panel of Figure 3 shows that the welfare is lowest for an intermediate homophily level, despite the low unemployment rate here. This result is driven by the relatively low employment rate in the high-skill sector for the intermediate homophily levels, because the work productivity of the highly skilled is much larger in this sector than in the low-skill sector.
Result 2. High-skilled workers achieve the highest welfare for low and high homophily levels because of a low unemployment rate and high wages.
The impact of social segregation on the total welfare of the society is shown in the lower-left panel of Figure 3 . The total welfare is the sum of utility earned by low-skilled and high-skilled workers in employment and in unemployment, plus the profits earned by firms. It can be expressed as
The total welfare is maximal for a high homophily level γ * T = 0.83. The lowskilled group had the largest welfare for a lower homophily level γ * L = 0.75, but for the high-skill group welfare is larger when the homophily level further increases. The combination of the two groups' welfare peaks at γ * T = 0.83. Finally, we briefly comment on the impact of the homophily level on the vacancy rate in the low-skilled sector, which is shown in the upperleft panel of Figure 3 . The vacancy rate is decreasing with the homophily level. Firms post fewer vacancies when wages are high, and both low-and high-skilled wages are largest in this sector when the homophily level is large.
In summary, there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the low-skilled unemployment rate and maximizes the welfare of low-skilled workers. The labor market outcomes of low-skilled workers can be the same in a highly segregated and a random social network. There exists a tension between the low-and high-skilled worker groups: whereas the former receives the highest welfare for an intermediate homophily level, the latter obtains the highest welfare when the homophily level is either very low or very high. An integrated society does not maximize the total welfare.
Robustness Checks
We have shown that the findings of Proposition 1 hold in the general equilibrium case for a set of reasonably chosen parameter values. Here, we perform robustness checks relative to a few key parameters that might affect the results presented above. First, we change the share of low-skilled workers π L and the number of neighbors of low-skilled workers k L . Table 2 shows the unemployment-minimizing homophily level γ * L for different combinations of these parameters after solving the general equilibrium model for all γ L ∈ [0, 1]. We can see that as long as high-skilled workers are more connected than low-skilled workers (k H > k L ), the unemploymentminimizing homophily level is always larger than the share of low-skilled workers: π L < γ * L < 1. This means that the network configuration that maximizes the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers exhibits a higher homophily level than the random network where γ L = π L and that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the job-finding rate and the homophily level, just as we discussed above. In addition, γ * L increases with the share of low-skilled workers π L . Table 3 shows results for changing the number of neighbors for both groups, while holding the share of low-skilled workers fixed at π L = 0.502. Again, the previous results hold as long as k H > k L and we can see that the unemployment-minimizing homophily level remains around γ * L = 0.75, independent of the values of k L and k H . The situation changes when the low-skilled group is more connected than the high-skilled group (k H < k L ). In this case, the job-finding rate of low-skilled workers is always largest when the homophily level is zero: low-skilled workers prefer to connect to high-skilled workers only. This is because the high-skilled worker group has a larger employment rate and there is also less competition for the job information of high-skilled social contacts because they have fewer neighbors. There is no advantage originating from connecting to low-skilled workers.
When the number of neighbors is the same for the two groups (k L = k H ), Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the unemployment-minimizing homophily level is positive and lower than the population share of lowskilled workers (0 < γ * < π L ). In the general equilibrium case, this seems to hold only for lower values of π L . When π L ≥ 0.5, the unemploymentminimizing homophily level is zero. This occurs because decreasing the homophily level to zero will increase the low-skilled vacancy rate and make the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers better. This additional effect of γ L was not taken into account in the partial equilibrium analysis where v L was treated as fixed.
Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market: When It Affects Productivity Differences
In the previous subsection, we analyzed the impact of social segregation when it affected the job-finding probabilities via social contacts. In reality, however, the reduction of social segregation can affect the underlying reasons as to why inter-group differences in labor market outcomes exist in the first place. Being connected to high-skilled workers might generate productivity spillovers for low-skilled workers, which might positively affect their labor market outcomes.
In this section, we analyze the impact of social integration on labor market outcomes when it improves the productivity of low-skilled workers. We assume that there is an inverse linear relationship between the homophily level and the productivity of low-skilled workers:
The parameter a captures the improvement in productivity of low-skilled workers when all of their social contacts change from low-to high-skilled workers. We keep the assumption that low-skilled workers cannot be employed in the high-skilled sector. We solve the model Social desegregation evidently improves the labor market outcomes of low-skilled workers through the rise of productivity. Firms in the lowskilled sector have higher incentives to post vacancies when the productivity of low-skilled workers rises (see the upper-left panel of Figure 6 ). This increases the job-finding chances of low-skilled workers for a given homophily level (see the upper-left panel of Figure 4 ). The job-finding rate of low-skilled workers still follows a non-monotonic pattern when the homophily level decreases. This shows the robustness of the result in Proposition 1. However, the unemployment-minimizing homophily level γ * L decreases when productivity rises with social integration. In the previous subsection, the unemployment-minimizing homophily level was γ * L = 0.75 (a = 0). When a = 0.1, it decreases to γ * L = 0.61, and to γ * L = 0.3 when a = 0.4 and the productivity increase is stronger. The unemployment rate of low-skilled workers also follows a non-monotonic pattern, although the wages monotonically increase with social integration due to the rising productivity that dominates the non-monotonic effect of outside options. Because of the wage rise, the welfare of low-skilled workers monotonically increases when the homophily level becomes smaller. The productivity rise of low-skilled workers also has an impact on the high-skilled worker group (see Figure 5) . As firms in the low-skill sector post more vacancies, high-skilled workers have a higher chance of finding a job in this sector. This leads to a lower unemployment rate, better outside options at wage bargaining, and higher wages for high-skilled workers. The wage increase reduces firms' profits in the high-skilled sector and thus they post fewer vacancies (see the upper-right panel of Figure 6 ). The jobfinding chances of high-skilled workers decrease for the high-skilled sector and there will be fewer workers employed in this sector (see the middleright panel of Figure 5 ). This latter effect implies lower welfare for the high-skilled workers: while the overall employment rate is larger, this does not compensate for the reduction of employment in the high-skilled sector where the value produced is larger. The welfare of high-skilled workers is largest when the two groups are completely segregated in their social networks. This also implies that the total welfare is maximal in a segregated society (see the bottom two panels of Figure 6 ). In summary, when social desegregation improves the productivity of low-skilled workers, their preferred social network is much more integrated than in the absence of productivity spillovers. High-skilled workers, however, still prefer a segregated social network, which shows that the conflict of interest between the two groups needs to be addressed by policymakers.
V. Applications
The Moving-to-Opportunity Experiment
The first application of the above findings is related to the MTO experiment, which provided the opportunity of relocation to low-poverty neighborhoods for residents of high-poverty neighborhoods. The experiment took place in five US cities between 1994 and 1997. Households eligible for public housing were randomly assigned to one of three groups: the first group received housing vouchers that could be used in census tracts with less than 10 percent poverty rate; the second group received housing vouchers that could be used without restriction; and a control group received no assistance. Kling et al. (2007) , Ludwig et al. (2012), and Chetty et al. (2016) evaluate the experiment's impact on labor market outcomes and find no significant improvement in the wages of those individuals who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods and were adults at the time of moving. However, Chetty et al. (2016) show that the MTO experiment significantly improved the labor market outcomes of children under 13 at the time of relocation. The findings of Heckman (2006) suggest that important cognitive skills develop in early childhood and these cognitive skills determine the learning abilities, and consequently productivity, at later stages of life. The results of Chetty et al. (2016) can thus be explained on the grounds that moving to a better neighborhood contributed toward an improvement in the cognitive skills of small children. This, in turn, was reflected in their higher productivity once they entered the labor market as young adults.
Our model can offer an explanation for the findings of the MTO experiment. In this context, the model economy corresponds to the labor market of an entire city that we treat as a single labor market (as opposed to separate labor markets for each neighborhood). When low-skilled workers reside in a high-poverty neighborhood, most of their neighbors are lowskilled workers, the network homophily is high, and the network of job recommendations consists of two separated groups. When workers move to a low-poverty neighborhood, they are able to establish connections to highskilled workers under the assumption that physical proximity facilitates link creation; the evidence in Wellman (1996) and Barrett and Campbell (1999) supports this assumption. We assume that they still participate in the same labor market, regardless of relocation.
Our results for the impact of social segregation on the labor market when it affects the network structure only (see Section IV) can offer an explanation for why relocation and connecting to better-educated social contacts had no significant impact on the labor market outcomes of adult workers. The findings show that the unemployment rate, wages, and welfare of low-skilled workers non-monotonically relate to the homophily level. Labor market outcomes of low-skilled workers can be very similar in both highly segregated and randomly mixed social networks. The move of low-skilled workers from a highly segregated neighborhood to one that is dominated by high-skilled workers changes their social network composition. However, this change might not improve their labor market outcomes, especially their unemployment rates and wages. In contrast, our analysis of the impact of social segregation on the labor market when it affects productivity differences (see the end of Section IV) shows that social desegregation can be beneficial for low-skilled workers if it not only affects the structure of job contact networks, but also improves the productivity of low-skilled workers. This explains why Chetty et al. (2016) find a positive impact of MTO on the labor market outcomes of children young enough at the time of relocation. 8 Our model explains the findings of the empirical MTO literature for adult workers based on increased competition for job referrals in an integrated social network. However, there might also be other explanations. The most obvious explanation is the isolation of low-skilled workers in a high-skilled neighborhood: low-skilled workers might not be able to form social connections with others in a richer neighborhood. The empirical evidence in the MTO experiment does not support this idea. Kling et al. (2007) show that the MTO experiment had a significant positive effect on "having friends with college a degree" or "having friends who earn more than $30,000 a year". In addition, there was no significant negative treatment effect on the percentage of workers who "chat with neighbors at least once a week", and no significant positive treatment effect on the percentage of workers who "have no friends who live in the neighborhood". This evidence indicates that relocated individuals were able to form at least weak ties with the residents of their new neighborhood. Despite this, the MTO experiment did not significantly increase the percentage of individuals who were able to find a job through social contacts living in the neighborhood (Kling et al., 2007) , which supports the findings of our model.
Another reason for the lack of improvement in the labor market outcomes could be that residents of low-poverty neighborhoods predominantly work in jobs that require a high education level and can provide job information only on such jobs that cannot be filled by lowskilled workers. There is no direct empirical evidence on this point; however, if it is true, this would refute the whole idea of improving low-skilled workers' job-finding chances by relocating them to better neighborhoods. The model presented in this paper shows that connections to high-skilled workers might not increase the job-finding probability even if high-skilled workers can provide referrals to low-skilled jobs (e.g., under 8 One might argue that the model would better capture the MTO experiment, if along with the homophily parameter γ L we would also change the fraction of low-skilled workers π L . This is because low-skilled workers relocated to another neighborhood where the fraction of low-skilled workers is low. The MTO studies compare their labor market outcomes to others who remained in neighborhoods with a high fraction of low-skilled workers. We did not perform the comparative statics exercise in this way because changing the population shares has a large impact on the vacancy rates v L and v H and on the structure of the economy. In this paper, we would like to focus on the impact of the network structure, not on changes in the structure of the economy. Nevertheless, we performed this exercise as well, and we still find a non-monotonic relationship between γ L and u L (w L L ). the assumption that they work at firms employing multiple worker types and can provide job information on low-skilled job openings).
Social Integration of Low-Skilled Immigrants
Another application of the model presented in this paper concerns the integration of low-skilled immigrants and their labor market outcomes. Social networks are an important job search method for immigrants both because social contacts provide information about the labor market of the host country before or after arrival, and also because social contacts can help to overcome discrimination by natives. Munshi (2003) shows that social networks help Mexican immigrants to find a job and obtain higher wages in the US labor market, carefully taking into account various sources of endogeneity. Beaman (2011) finds that this positive effect of social networks is restricted to contacts who arrived in the country earlier, while social contacts who arrive at the same time compete for the same jobs and decrease the job-finding probability for each other. While the positive impact of ethnic networks has been pointed out by many studies (see Elliott, 2001; Mouw, 2002; Aguilera and Massey, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra, 2007; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012) , others argue that the isolation of immigrants from native workers also limits their labor market opportunities. Social integration with native workers is more beneficial for immigrants as native workers are more likely to be employed or to hold jobs in better occupations.
A large number of papers show that social connections with native individuals positively correlate with the probability of being employed and with the earnings for immigrants (Kazemipur, 2006; Kahanec and Mendola, 2009; Lancee, 2010) . Most of these papers do not address the endogeneity problem originating from network formation: there might be a problem of reverse causality as more successful immigrants have a better chance at forming links with native contacts and there might be unobserved worker characteristics that explain both labor market success and connections to natives.
When these sources of endogeneity are taken into account in the estimation, the impact of native social contacts on labor market outcomes of immigrants becomes less clear. Kanas et al. (2011) study various immigrant groups in Germany and use panel data fixed effects to address endogeneity. They find a positive relationship between having native social contacts and employment probability as well as earnings. Li (2017) studies the impact of social network homophily for immigrants in Canada and uses instrumental variable techniques to address the endogeneity of social networks. He finds no significant relationship between inbreeding homophily of social contacts and immigrants' earnings/employment probability. Chiswick and Wang (2016) study the labor market outcomes of four immigrant groups in the Netherlands using panel data and fixed effects models. They measure the types of social contacts that immigrants interact with at work and in their free time, using three categories: "more coethnic contact", "more contact with Dutch people", and "both equally". They estimate the impact of these social contact types on employment probability and earnings, and they find that having contact with Dutch people has no significant impact on labor market outcomes. Interestingly, the category having contacts with both co-ethnic and Dutch people is more often significant and has a larger positive impact on labor market outcomes. This evidence suggests that a mixture of social contacts supports the jobfinding chances of immigrants the best and points toward a non-monotonic relationship between homophily and labor market success, just as we have found in our model.
In this context, the model represents the labor market of a country and the low-skilled (high-skilled) worker group represents immigrant (native) workers. Native workers might be more productive either because they have higher education on average or because low-skilled workers are discriminated against in the labor market. In the latter case, the productivity difference captures the discrimination coefficient in the same way as Becker (2010) and the "high-skilled" firms discriminate to the extent that they do not hire any immigrants at all. The findings of the model can explain why some of the papers do not obtain a significant positive effect of having native social contacts on immigrants' labor market outcomes. When immigrants establish connections to native workers, they also create competition for each other to obtain the job information possessed by native workers, which might explain why their labor market outcomes do not improve on average. This finding extends the ideas in Beaman (2011) , who studies co-ethnic networks, to networks with native-immigrant connections. We also highlight that this effect is important only if productivity spillovers from natives to immigrants do not exist or are not too large. When productivity spillovers are significant, immigrants can benefit from social integration with natives. One example is the acquisition of local language through contacts to natives, which certainly has a positive impact on labor market outcomes (Chiswick, 1991; Chiswick and Miller, 2002) .
VI. Conclusion and Discussion
We analyze the labor market effects of social integration between two worker groups with different skills levels in a search-and-matching model. Workers can find a job either on the formal labor market or through their social contacts. Integration changes the composition of social connections and the job-finding chances of workers. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that maximizes the wages and welfare obtained by low-skilled workers and minimizes their unemployment rate. Their labor market outcomes can be the same in a very segregated society and in an integrated society. Integration is beneficial for low-skilled workers only if it generates productivity spillovers from high-to low-skilled workers.
The model's predictions can explain the empirical evidence on the impact of the MTO experiment. Chetty et al. (2016) showed that the MTO experiment did not improve the labor market outcomes of adults and children over 13 at the time of relocation. In contrast, for children under 13 at the time of moving, relocation improved earnings and jobfinding chances. We show that low-skilled workers' labor market outcomes might not improve by connecting to high-skilled workers through social connections -integration has positive effects only if it is accompanied by spillovers that affect the low-skilled workers' productivity. We also argue that the model can explain the mixed evidence regarding the labor market effects of the social integration of immigrant workers among natives. Chiswick and Wang (2016) and Li (2017) find that social connections to natives do not reduce the unemployment probability of immigrants and do not improve their wages, while Kanas et al. (2011) find significant improvement along these dimensions.
Our results are based on a few critical assumptions. First, we assume that an employed social contact passes job information on to a randomly chosen neighbor. This assumption creates competition for the limited job information among second-order neighbors in the network. Alternatively, one could assume that the job information is shared with every neighbor. In this case, the competition is realized among job applicants and the firm might hire one of the candidates at random, leading to the same effective job-finding probability as in the model. Second, the social network is treated as exogenous in the model and the analysis concerns the comparative statics of one network parameter, the homophily level. One could ask which network configuration is incentive-compatible in the case when workers form social connections endogenously and link formation requires mutual consent. Our analysis suggests that while low-skilled workers prefer either moderate or complete mixing with high-skilled workers, high-skilled workers have no incentives to connect to low-skilled workers. 9 There exists a conflict of interest between the two groups. In a broader context, social connections form not only based on job-finding incentives but also along many other incentives and personal circumstances. As the empirical evidence above suggests, both MTO participants and immigrant workers can establish social contacts with individuals of a better educational background, even if the latter have no incentives to establish connections, narrowly originating from incentives related to labor market outcomes. We keep the analysis of endogenous network formation for future research.
Third, we suppose that high-skilled workers employed in high-skilled jobs can also provide job information on low-skilled openings. The alternative assumption could be that only high-skilled workers employed in low-skilled jobs can provide job information on low-skilled vacancies. In this case, social integration would be even less beneficial to low-skilled workers in the absence of productivity spillovers as only a few of their high-skilled social contacts would work mismatched in the low-skilled sector. This would further highlight the importance of productivity spillovers connected to social integration. Our assumption reflects the idea that highskilled workers work at firms employing workers in multiple occupations, including some that require low skills, so that they can also be aware of low-skilled openings. To avoid complications related to the modeling of firm size, we do not incorporate this idea explicitly in the model. Our results suggest that even under this more favorable assumption, integration might not result in better labor market outcomes for low-skilled workers in the absence of productivity spillovers.
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